PROVISIONAL

For participants only

NPT/CONF.IV/SR.6
30 November 1990

ENGLISH
Original: FRENCH

FOURTH REVIEW CONFERENCE OF THE PARTIES TO THE TREATY ON THE NON-PROLIFERATION OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS

PROVISIONAL SUMMARY RECORD OF THE 6th MEETING

Held at the Palais des Nations, Geneva,
on Thursday, 23 August 1990, at 10 a.m.

President: Mr. de RIVERO (Peru)

CONTENTS

Programme of work (continued)

General debate (continued)

Corrections to this record should be submitted in one of the working languages. They should be set forth in a memorandum and also incorporated in a copy of the record. They should be sent within one week of the date of this document to the Official Records Editing Section, room E.4108, Palais des Nations, Geneva.

GE.90-66033/2648B

The meeting was called to order at 10.20 a.m.

PROGRAMME OF WORK (agenda item 10) (continued) (NPT/CONF.IV/CRP.1)

The PRESIDENT suggested that the participants should adopt the programme of work (NPT/CONF.IV/CRP.1) relating to the organization of the work of the Plenary and Main Committees over the following days. If there was no objection, he would take it that the programme of work was adopted.

It was so decided.

The PRESIDENT said that at the first plenary meeting the Secretary-General of the Conference had read out a statement describing the serious financial situation of the Conference. He in turn wished to make an urgent appeal to all States parties to pay their contributions in advance. Delegations should contact the Conference secretariat for information on the appropriate means of payment.

GENERAL DEBATE (agenda item 12) (continued)

Mr. TCHEUL (Democratic People's Republic of Korea) said that the work of the Conference would be of historic importance, in view of developments in the international political situation during the past five years and in view of the 1995 deadline, when it would have to be decided whether to extend the Treaty. The Fourth Review Conference also provided the opportunity, for the first time, to consider the NPT's operation in the light of the new trend towards reconciliation and détente, and to take a number of indispensable measures in the area of nuclear disarmament in order to ensure that the Treaty was kept in force.

The NPT had already played a significant role in that no new nuclear-weapon State had emerged in recent years. Since the Third Review Conference efforts had been made by the nuclear-weapon States to achieve nuclear disarmament and progress had been made towards that goal. The 1987 Treaty between the United States and the USSR on the Elimination of their Intermediate-Range and Shorter-Range Missiles, the prospects for strategic arms reductions and the unilateral reduction of certain tactical nuclear weapons aroused hopes that negotiations on nuclear disarmament would extricate themselves from their three-decade-long stagnation. It was for the Conference to see that those hopes were fulfilled.

It was essential, first of all, to evaluate the situation correctly. The NPT had more contracting parties than any other international instrument, but although 20 years had passed since its entry into force, its implementation

had not led to the expected levels of reduction. The nuclear weapons whose reduction was currently being planned represented less than 4 per cent of the total arsenal, and even if strategic arms were reduced by 50 per cent as against the 30 per cent currently proposed, their number would still be higher than when the Treaty had been concluded. The only difference was that the visible quantitative arms race, had been replaced by an invisible qualitative race that was even affecting outer space. The progress in the negotiations on nuclear disarmament in recent years seemed to be attributable more to the change in East-West relations than to an awareness by the nuclear-weapon States of their obligations under the Treaty. There was a continuing imbalance between the latter and the other States with respect to the implementation of the Preamble and provisions of the Treaty. It was regrettable that the efforts by the non-nuclear-weapon States parties to the NPT to implement its provisions continued to fail because the nuclear-weapon States that were also parties did not implement them.

The current détente and co-operation provided a favourable opportunity for adopting decisive measures to attain the Treaty's fundamental objectives. To adapt the Treaty to a constantly-changing situation, it should be complemented by effective measures enabling it to fulfil its mission more satisfactorily. First of all, the nuclear-weapon States parties to the NPT must be prohibited from deploying their weapons outside their territory. Twenty years before, the Cold War and the confrontation between States had made it impossible to conclude an agreement on that question, but the current situation provided a fundamentally different climate. Now that the nuclear-weapon States were moving towards co-operation and abandoning the idea of confrontation, there was no longer any objection to banning such deployment in other countries. That type of measure would also reflect the will of the nuclear-weapon States parties to the Treaty to attain its basic objectives and to contribute effectively to the elimination of the risk of nuclear war.

The creation of nuclear-free zones was one of the most effective ways to prevent the proliferation of nuclear weapons, but reality had shown that the treaties already concluded in that area were not complied with by the nuclear-weapon States. Yet it should not be such a great sacrifice for them to acknowledge the importance of establishing such zones and express their intention to respect them. As to the nuclear-free zones established by the non-nuclear-weapon States to prevent nuclear proliferation, it would be sufficient for the nuclear-weapon States not to impede their establishment.

A comprehensive nuclear test ban was absolutely essential to stop the nuclear arms race and put an end to the qualitative improvement of nuclear weapons, which aroused as many fears as their numerical increase, since it maintained their destructive capacity at the same level and aggravated the risk of nuclear war. Until the nuclear-weapon States showed their political will to conclude a comprehensive test-ban treaty as soon as possible, their commitment to ending the nuclear arms race would remain doubtful and the authority of the NPT uncertain. In that connection, his delegation endorsed the proposals for a moratorium on nuclear testing, if only through 1995.

The most effective security guarantee against the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons by the non-nuclear-weapon countries was obviously complete nuclear disarmament, but it was no less obvious that until that became a reality, legally-binding guarantees prohibiting such use would be more valid than a mere unilateral and conditional declaration. The non-aligned and neutral countries had called for the adoption of an international instrument of that type, as had Nigeria, Egypt and many other countries.

An agreement in principle during the present Conference on the above-mentioned problems would be of decisive importance in strengthening the non-proliferation régime and ushering in a climate favourable to the Treaty's extension.

The Democratic People's Republic of Korea had acceded to the NPT in very particular circumstances. The Korean people was one of the only peoples to have experienced the threat of nuclear weapons. In the early 1950s, threats to use the atomic bomb against it had led to the separation of the families of several million inhabitants. In early 1957, when the question of non-proliferation had first been raised, nuclear weapons had been deployed in the southern part of the peninsula. Beginning in 1976, joint military exercises known as "Team Spirit", in which one nuclear-weapon State had participated, had begun in the same region. The exercises had grown even bigger in size in the mid-1980s, with the participation of 200,000 soldiers as opposed to 60,000 at the outset and the execution of nuclear war manoeuvres with the mobilization of airborne command posts and vectors. His Government had thus found itself obliged to seek a decisive measure of protection. That was what had prompted it to consider acceding to the NPT, the only international instrument at that time explicity to call for as rapid a halt as possible to the nuclear arms race and to set nuclear disarmament as its basic

objective. By contributing to the Treaty's universality and to the strengthening of the non-proliferation régime, it had encouraged general nuclear disarmament while consolidating its own security. Furthermore, the legal commitment it had undertaken not to manufacture or import nuclear weapons had helped to reduce the imminent nuclear threat.

Unfortunately, events had not come up to its expectations. Whereas considerable progress had been made in other areas in reducing nuclear weapons, none of those weapons had disappeared from the Korean peninsula and no sign of a reduction had been noted. Every year, nuclear war exercises in the peninsula took on an increasingly menacing dimension. In addition, there had never been a favourable response to its proposals for a considerable reduction in conventional forces in northern and southern Korea with a view to creating a climate conducive to the dismantling of nuclear weapons, or for negotiations aimed at making the Korean peninsula a nuclear-free zone. His country had thus had to be more circumspect in dealing with the problem of concluding a safeguards agreement, anxious as it was to comply with its obligations under the Treaty but also to safeguard its national security.

The safeguards negotiations begun with IAEA the main agreement concluded in July 1990 on all points, with the exception of one provision concerning the entry into force of the safeguards, and the agreement to continue the negotiations indicated that his Government was fully determined to meet its obligations under article III of the Treaty.

Regarding national security, his Government was concerned about eliminating the current nuclear threat, which presupposed the satisfactory implementation of article VI of the Treaty. The problem of concluding a safeguards agreement would be resolved as soon as the Democratic People's Republic of Korea had been given a legal guarantee that its security would be ensured until such time as nuclear disarmament had been achieved. His delegation was convinced that the international trend towards détente and co-operation should enable such a solution to be reached. In addition, the encouraging remarks by the party concerned regarding the elimination of the nuclear threat to the country increased confidence that a solution to that problem would be found.

It should also be noted that it had been agreed to begin North-South political-military talks in September. Those would be the first of their kind in the history of the Korean peninsula and would be attended by both

delegations headed by their Prime Ministers. The disarmament of the peninsula would be one of the priority items on the agenda for those talks. The presence of huge armed forces in the north and south was a major concern for the Korean people and for the neighbouring countries. That military confrontation had often been referred to to justify the deployment of nuclear weapons in the peninsula, but the disarmament talks should create the necessary trust between north and south and in neighbouring countries, and reduce the nuclear threat hanging over the peninsula. Declaring the peninsula a nuclear-free zone would remove one of the potential foci of nuclear war in the world and thereby strengthen the non-proliferation régime.

In conclusion, he expressed the hope that the Conference would make all the parties to the Treaty fully aware of their obligations and enable them to take joint action to implement the Treaty's provisions.

Mr. STAIKOV (Bulgaria) said that the atmosphere in which the Fourth Review Conference was being held could not be more favourable for attainment of the Treaty's main objectives. The democratic process that had begun in Eastern Europe was creating an entirely new international climate in which relations between States were gradually shedding their ideological yoke. The division of Europe was in the process of being overcome, and the blocs, which stated that they no longer regarded each other as adversaries, were preparing to change their military structures and defence policies, thus creating favourable conditions for disarmament over an extended front. In addition, efforts aimed at setting up a European system of collective security were becoming institutionalized, and the bases for world peace were being strengthened.

In Bulgaria, rapid democratic changes and the transition to a market economy were broadening the foreign policy horizon, and the country was firmly committed to economic and political integration with Europe, while preserving the advantages of the relations it had until then maintained with other countries and alliances. His Government would continue to support all efforts aimed at consolidating the foundations of international peace and security, and converting military potential to meet the needs of society. It was precisely in order to achieve those objectives that it remained committed to implementing the principles of the NPT, which it considered to be one of mankind's principal achievements.

The non-proliferation of nuclear weapons was one of the pillars of any nuclear disarmament activity. At a time when the two major nuclear Powers were drastically reducing their arsenals, guaranteeing the non-proliferation of nuclear weapons would create favourable conditions for freely continuing such a process. The participation of the other nuclear States would be absolutely essential in order to go beyond certain limits in those reductions. However, an increase in the number of nuclear-weapon States would entail new risks and exacerbate the problems. That was a further reason why the principles of the NPT should be resolutely supported.

His Government considered that horizontal non-proliferation and the reduction of nuclear arsenals should not be systematically linked. Horizontal non-proliferation played an important part in concerted efforts to ensure mutual security and promote disarmament. Effectively and durably preventing new States from acquiring nuclear weapons would be one of the prerequisites for preventing the aggravation of tensions in international relations and crises that might have fateful consequences for mankind. The NPT was the indispensable basis for international efforts to limit the risk of nuclear war, strengthen stability at the regional and global levels, and develop international co-operation in the peaceful uses of nuclear energy. The Treaty should maintain those same objectives in the future.

There was no doubt that the Treaty was an effective instrument for, since its entry into force, no signatory State had acquired nuclear weapons; it was also the most universal international legal instrument on nuclear disarmament, since nearly 90 per cent of the States Members of the United Nations had acceded to it. For that reason, his delegation, which reaffirmed its full support for the purposes and principles of the Treaty, hoped that a constructive approach would be adopted at the 1995 Conference, when the States parties would decide whether to extend it.

His Government was deeply concerned at the fact that certain States that were not parties to the Treaty were seeking to acquire a nuclear capability, and hoped that they would be more emphatically urged to accede to the Treaty. It nevertheless noted with satisfaction that some nuclear-weapon States that were not parties to the Treaty were despite everything taking a definite interest in the non-proliferation régime, as witnessed by the presence of observers for China and France at the Conference.

Bulgaria had been among the first States to sign and ratify the Treaty and to have concluded with IAEA a safeguards agreement on its nuclear activities for peaceful purposes. Since the conclusion of that agreement, the Agency's inspectors had not observed any breach of the régime established under the Treaty, and in order to make the inspectors' work easier his Government had now eliminated the procedure of prior notification of inspection, provided that the experts appointed by IAEA were citizens of countries with which Bulgaria maintained diplomatic relations.

His Government complied strictly with the guidelines for exports of nuclear material, equipment and technology, and in the context of its transition to a market economy and economic liberalization, it was attempting to exercise more rigorous control over the nuclear sector. In the international sphere, his country was actively co-operating in the use of nuclear energy for peaceful purposes and contributed to the IAEA technical assistance and co-operation fund. It received specialists from other IAEA member countries, offered the services of Bulgarian experts and also took advantage of the technical assistance extended by the Agency in the civilian uses of nuclear energy.

Public opinion in Bulgaria was seriously concerned about the direct effects on the population and the environment, of the radioactive contamination resulting from the accident at the Chernobyl power station, and all the necessary studies were being conducted. Bulgaria had signed and ratified the Convention on Early Notification of a Nuclear Accident and the Convention on Assistance in the Case of a Nuclear Accident or Radiological Emergency. A regional agreement on that question had been concluded among the member countries of the Council for Mutual Economic Assistance, and in 1989 his Government had signed an agreement with the Greek Government on notification of a nuclear accident and the exchange of information on nuclear facilities.

In Bulgaria, a third of all electric energy was derived from one nuclear power station. The construction of a second power station was being considered, but because of public opposition, expert opinions had been sought with the help of IAEA on the choice of location and the technical specifications of the planned installation, and there was a possibility that construction plans might be dropped. That question was also the subject of bilateral negotiations between Bulgaria and Romania, and of a detailed study by several bodies representing the interests of the population and scientific circles.

His Government was convinced that continued nuclear disarmament efforts would contribute significantly to the strengthening of the non-proliferation régime. The elimination of thousands of intermediate-range and short-range nuclear missiles by the Soviet Union and the United States represented considerable progress towards that end, and it was to be hoped that the agreement concluded in June on a framework for reducing strategic nuclear arsenals would lead to the rapid conclusion of a treaty on the subject and that negotiations on future reductions would begin immediately after the conclusion of the START-I Treaty, which would be fully in keeping with the States parties' commitments under article VI of the Treaty. The unilateral withdrawal of hundreds of tactical nuclear charges by the USSR and the United States was another encouraging sign of full compliance with the provisions of article VI. His Government also welcomed the progress in the negotiations on conventional arms reductions, confidence-building measures in Europe and the prohibition of chemical weapons. And it welcomed the recent signing of the protocols on the control mechanism of the agreements concluded between the USSR and the United States in 1974 and 1976, and hoped that those agreements would be ratified shortly.

In the final document of the Conference, which his delegation hoped would be adopted unanimously, the nuclear-weapon States should make a clear commitment to comply with their obligations under the Treaty. The establishment of an ad hoc committee of the Conference on Disarmament, which should make it possible to begin concrete work on a multilateral treaty on a comprehensive test ban, was another welcome development. The creation of nuclear-free zones in accordance with article VII of the Treaty would also have a positive effect. In the Balkans, Bulgaria's own region, some encouraging progress had been made towards that goal during the past five years, and international arrangements of that type should be formulated and fully implemented. Regarding negative security assurances for the non-nuclear-weapon States parties to the Treaty, which would appear in a legally binding international instrument, his delegation believed that the proposals on that subject should be given thorough consideration in view of the opportunity they offered to strengthen the international régime set forth by the Treaty, which was particularly important at a time of rapid and unprecedented changes throughout the world.

Mr. HOULLEZ (Belgium) noted that since the previous Review Conference, a new era of dialogue and understanding had been ushered in and was already helping to reduce tensions throughout the world. With such prospects for progress, compliance with the fundamental principles of international law was all the more essential.

In the area of disarmament, the INF Agreement, the first since the Second World War to be accompanied by effective verification measures, was being implemented satisfactorily by all the parties. The signing of the START Agreement on the reduction of strategic weapons, which would have a strong impact on the capabilities of the two major nuclear Powers, appeared to be imminent, and the North Atlantic Treaty Alliance, for its part, had repeated its will to begin negotiations on short-range weapons as soon as an agreement on conventional forces in Europe was signed. Similarly, at their London summit, the Heads of State and Government of the Alliance countries had taken full account of the new relations between the countries of Europe, which aroused hopes that the new NATO strategy would be less dependent on nuclear weapons. The United States had in turn announced its intention to refrain from modernizing its LANCE missiles and to withdraw its nuclear artillery from Europe. In the area of the cessation of nuclear testing, too, a welcome sign was the imminent ratification of the protocols to the 1974 and 1976 treaties on thresholds and peaceful nuclear explosions by the two nuclear super-Powers. In that connection, the re-establishment of the Ad Hoc Committee on a Nuclear Test Ban proved that the final objective, to which Belgium was strongly committed, namely, a permanent and verifiable halt to nuclear testing, could finally be achieved.

Noting that negotiations were continuing in the Conference on Disarmament on a complete and universal ban on chemical weapons, his Government hoped that a treaty on the subject would shortly be opened for signature by all States. It also hoped that the rapid conclusion of an agreement on the reduction of conventional forces in Europe and of another agreement on confidence-building and security measures would make a major contribution towards creating conditions in which peace in Europe would be based less on fear of weapons and more on well-founded trust in mutual renouncement of the threat or use of armed force.

In that particularly promising disarmament process, the Treaty continued to occupy an essential position. Having effectively and verifiably renounced nuclear weapons, the States parties were entitled to expect real progress in the area of nuclear disarmament. In that connection, his delegation welcomed the fact that, since the previous Review Conference in 1985, over 10 new members, including Spain, which had a significant nuclear programme, had signed the Treaty. It also welcomed the presence at the Fourth Conference of observers for the two nuclear Powers that were not parties to the Treaty, France and China, which, it was hoped, would rapidly consider acceding to the Treaty.

There were still certain grounds for concern about the proliferation of nuclear weapons, in particular with respect to the States that had not yet made binding and verifiable legal commitments in that area. The proliferation of ballistic missiles was also a source of concern, which was why Belgium, together with other States, had acceded to an international non-proliferation régime in that field and hoped that a growing number of States would support that régime.

It was unfortunate and at times worrying that certain States parties had not yet concluded a safeguards agreement with IAEA, as they were required to do under article III of the Treaty. Such a failure to meet obligations might raise doubts as to the actual political commitment of those States or their genuine will to renounce nuclear weapons, especially when the States involved were ones that had significant nuclear facilities. In that connection, his delegation urged the Democratic People's Republic of Korea, which had signed the Treaty in 1985, rapidly to conclude a safeguards agreement with the Agency, in conformity with the promise that that country's representative had recently made at the Conference. His delegation noted with satisfaction that the Agency had not observed any flagrant violations of the provisions of article III of the Treaty since the previous Review Conference. Belgium, for its part, fully supported the Agency in its implementation of safeguards, and in that context, with the co-operation of the members of the European Atomic Energy Community, it had set up a programme aimed at optimizing their implementation.

In his delegation's opinion, widespread safeguards should be applied to all civilian nuclear activities throughout the world, in the nuclear-weapon States, non-nuclear-weapon States and States that were not parties to the Treaty. Belgium would be more inclined to require safeguards as a condition

for exporting nuclear material and equipment if all the exporting States decided to apply that policy; it did not wish to see States that followed less strict rules gain an economic advantage.

There had been continued large-scale international co-operation in the nuclear field during the past five years, and Belgium had continued to contribute to such co-operation, especially by admitting trainees from all regions of the world to its laboratories and companies, by sending its experts and technicians to IAEA meetings and by ensuring that its nuclear industrial sector made a maximum contribution to the safety of its installations.

In that positive context, the disarmament process could no doubt be enhanced if enrichment and reprocessing facilities, which formed the basis for manufacturing nuclear bombs, were placed under IAEA control. That would make it possible to know the exact quantities of fissionable material that States were using to build their military nuclear arsenals, it being understood that controls would cease as soon as the material entered the nuclear weapons manufacturing facilities. Controls would make it possible to verify whether nuclear-weapon States were exceeding the limits they had set themselves and would also eliminate the discrimination argument put forward by certain States that did not wish to accede to the Treaty or refused to place their facilities under IAEA control.

His delegation regretted that the results of the work of the Contact Group entrusted with preparing a draft convention on the prohibition of attacks against nuclear facilities had not come up to expectations, and it would support any proposal aimed at remedying the lack of progress in that area.

The 1995 Conference would be an important landmark in the non-proliferation régime, since it would be called upon to decide the Treaty's future. His delegation believed that it would be both irresponsible and very dangerous to allow a régime that had already clearly proved itself to weaken, and it hoped that all States parties, without distinction, would place their facilities under IAEA safeguards. Lastly, considering the positive developments since the previous Review Conference, the work of the Fourth Conference should lead to the adoption of a constructive final document illustrating the ever-increasing importance of the Treaty, which remained the corner-stone of the non-proliferation system.

Mr. CALDERON (Peru) said that it had probably been out of fear of the consequences of a nuclear conflict that the super-Powers had begun negotiations on a treaty to check the proliferation of such weapons of mass destruction. The NPT had been an important initial stage on the road to reason. It was simply one way of creating conditions that would make it possible to eliminate nuclear weapons from the face of the earth once and for all. Non-proliferation did not mean elimination or reduction, but non-reproduction. That was why the Treaty was discriminatory, in two respects. First, it was the first international instrument legally to recognize five States as being the sole nuclear Powers under article IX, paragraph 3. It was perhaps that discriminatory nature that explained the existence of article VI. Indeed, since it was not a nuclear disarmament treaty, its moral authority and universalization depended on the cessation of the nuclear arms race and on nuclear disarmament, two processes leading to general and complete disarmament. Secondly, the Treaty gave preferential treatment to the non-nuclear-weapon States parties. Article IV provided that non-nuclear-weapon States should benefit from the development of the many uses of nuclear energy for peaceful purposes.

The evaluation of the Treaty's implementation showed that the situation was quite different from that imagined by the negotiators in 1968. To a considerable increase in nuclear weapons and their destructive power had been added latent horizontal proliferation, partly due to a certain flexibility on the part of the few supplier States in the nuclear products trade. But perhaps most surprisingly, the non-proliferation measures applied to other complementary technological fields might endanger security in more than one region of the world and, as a result, peace.

Peru had renounced nuclear weapons when it had acceded to the Treaty of Tlatelolco and the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons; it had done so to preserve world peace, and to devote itself to economic and social development and the struggle against poverty, two priority areas. It was for the same reasons that his Government advocated strengthening the NPT in order to guarantee its extension beyond 1995 and to promote its universalization.

The successful implementation of the 1987 Washington Treaty, on the elimination of intermediate-range and short-range missiles, and the announcement that the super-Powers would be concluding a treaty on the elimination of certain categories of strategic offensive weapons by the end of

the year were examples of the measures that must be taken in order to lessen the disappointment of the non-nuclear-weapon States parties at the implementation of article VI.

However, his Government could not understand why States were still hesitating to enter into multilateral negotiations aimed at prohibiting all nuclear tests. Continued testing for the purpose of further refining weapons or making technological innovations would have a destabilizing effect. A halt to testing would be an appopriate measure for increasing trust among the nuclear Powers. In addition, the large-scale, verifiable reduction of nuclear arsenals and the prohibition of all tests were not incompatible and could be considered top-priority objectives. Giving one precedence over the other would be something new, for article VI drew no distinction in that respect.

His delegation accordingly hoped that the Conference would reach an agreement that fulfilled the international community's demands. The time had come to set a deadline for States parties to take all the necessary measures in order to achieve the cessation of nuclear tests. States might set the 1990s as a deadline and focus their efforts on gradually reducing the number and strength of the tests until they were banned completely. The negotiations might initially be bilateral, between the two super-Powers, then among three or five parties, and finally multilateral. Lastly, a national verification mechanism might be set up and implemented by each of the nuclear Powers; it would be linked to an international verification network under the control of an international body.

It was to be hoped that, at the present Review Conference, the super-Powers would take specific measures to extend the de facto moratorium on the production of special fissionable material intended for the manufacture of nuclear weapons. That would be the best way of strengthening States' trust in the process of world military denuclearization. The United States and the Soviet Union should reaffirm the commitments they had made at the recent Washington summit. The negotiations should include the dismantling of a number of nuclear warheads that appeared in the announced treaty on strategic offensive weapons, as well as providing for the use of recovered fissionable material for civilian purposes.

The universalization of the NPT would depend on how the States parties managed to resolve the problem of latent horizontal proliferation. For the time being, certain suppliers of nuclear material, technology and services were not requiring the importing State to agree to submit all its nuclear

facilities to safeguards. Since the measures taken by the London suppliers group or by the Zangger Committee to check horizontal proliferation had not been sufficient, the only remaining option was greater compliance with the provisions of the Treaty in nuclear trade. What was to be avoided was the creation of an imbalance between the importing States parties to the Treaty and the importing States that were not parties. The same restrictions could not be imposed on both categories without requiring in return that they meet the same obligations. Putting them on an equal footing would amount to ascribing the same intentions to them, which would lessen the Treaty's importance. It was absolutely essential to set up a consultation mechanism that was limited to States parties in order to settle the question of the supply of nuclear products. The adoption of a code of conduct would be the best solution, provided it did not accord the same treatment to States parties and non-parties. The States parties to the Treaty should also consider concluding agreements on negative security assurances and prohibiting attacks against nuclear facilities.

Although the situation in certain regions of the world was disturbing, the international climate was extremely favourable for considering the Treaty's extension. It was in the interests of all States parties to continue to work towards peace.

Mr. RASAPUTRAM (Sri Lanka) said that the Fourth Review Conference was of particular significance. The assessment of two decades of Treaty operation would set the stage for the States parties to decide in 1995 whether to extend it. Profound changes had taken place in the world: security was becoming less weaponized and more political, and inter-State relations among traditional adversaries had improved. New tensions and dangers continued to arise within and among States, but some of the seemingly intractable regional problems were in the process of being solved, and the United Nations had been able to reassert its peace-keeping role. Thus the Conference should focus on the question how the NPT might serve peace and the well-being of States parties in the future.

Developments since 1985 provided material for assessing the extent to which problems had been solved or aggravated. The encouraging positive developments should not be allowed to mask what remained to be done. Everyone must work collectively and constructively to address the genuine concerns of the overwhelming majority of non-nuclear States parties to the Treaty.

The political compromise that had given birth to the Treaty had envisaged that it should not only prevent more nuclear-weapon States and new nuclear weapons from emerging, but that it should also propel the nuclear disarmament process towards the complete elimination of nuclear weapons. Sri Lanka was gratified to note that the number of States parties had increased from 130 in 1985 to some 140 at present. Nuclear weapons and the nuclear arms race had been the sine qua non of the cold war, but the time had now come to move away from nuclear terror and to find alternative means of security. His Government earnestly hoped that all States parties, particularly the depositary States, would develop a framework that would support progressive disarmament and alternative means of security through international co-operation.

Sri Lanka had become a party to the Non-Proliferation Treaty in the conviction that the Treaty would contribute to international peace and security if implemented in good faith. It had thus joined the group of States that did not believe that the possession of nuclear weapons was a means of ensuring national security. His Government had fulfilled all its obligations and contributed to the efforts to implement the Treaty. It had also reminded the States parties of the collective nature of the obligations entered into under the Treaty. As a non-aligned country, Sri Lanka had not acceded to any nuclear-weapons-related security agreement or any other military alliance system; rather it had sought to ensure its national security through political and diplomatic means. His Government had continued to refuse to allow foreign ships carrying nuclear weapons to enter Sri Lankan ports. It supported international efforts aimed at achieving nuclear disarmament and the establishment of nuclear-weapon-free zones, including zones in south Asia.

The NPT was the most widely accepted arms control treaty. Sri Lanka was particularly pleased to see greater participation by observers at the current Review Conference. All States parties should explore all possibilities of encouraging other States to become interested in the Treaty, in order that its purposes and provisions might enjoy universal acceptance. His delegation believed that the multilateral review of nuclear issues would help to create incentives for wider adherence to the Treaty. Exclusiveness in negotiating nuclear issues should give way to multilateral negotiations in which all concerned parties could play a role in defining the principles and stages of nuclear disarmament.

His Government welcomed the recent progress in bilateral nuclear arms negotiations. Multilateral work on nuclear disarmament issues did not mean that all countries should participate in the START negotiations. Bilateral and multilateral approaches were complementary.

There were a number of reasons why the nuclear-weapon States should demonstrate the political will to make greater use of the multilateral approach to nuclear issues. First, nuclear weapons by their very nature were of concern to all countries, not only to their possessors. Secondly, at a time of considerable progress in bilateral arms negotiations, efforts in that area should be globalized. The development of a framework for multilateral negotiation would be a confidence-building measure, as it could involve not only the existing nuclear-weapon States, but also the non-nuclear-weapon States and other nuclear-capable States. Certain regional nuclear ambiguities could be given some transparency and the problem of latent proliferation addressed. Thirdly, the great majority of States parties saw the NPT not as an end in itself, but as a step in the process of disarmament which must be pursued in a multilateral framework. Like many other States parties, Sri Lanka wished to strengthen the provisions of the Treaty, and wider adherence would be an important step in that direction. Certain countries hesitated to accede to the Treaty for conceptual, legal, political and other reasons.

The non-nuclear-weapon States parties to the NPT believed that parallel ways should be explored to strengthen the Treaty by involving the "threshold countries", which were prepared to manufacture nuclear weapons, in a multilateral process that would make it easier for them to gravitate towards the purposes and provisions of the NPT. A multilateral process in which all nuclear-weapon States and the "threshold States" could participate would be a constructive approach to the desired objective. It derived from the letter and spirit of article VI of the Treaty.

There were many nuclear issues ripe for multilateral treatment. One was the cessation of fissionable material production and the negotiation of a multilaterally verifiable treaty on the subject. A de facto moratorium appeared to exist on the production of fissionable material for weapons purposes in the two major nuclear-weapon States. Concern about nuclear safety had brought to the fore the environmental hazards of both civilian and military nuclear activities. The cessation of fissionable material production for weapons purposes would substantially reduce such hazards and save billions

of dollars needed for the safe revival of aging military nuclear plants. Such a measure might be made multilateral and therefore non-discriminatory. It would also help to address the problem of latent proliferation. That would amount to strong reinforcement of the NPT and an effective parallel measure towards the universalization of the non-proliferation régime.

Turning to the implementation of the Treaty, he was gratified to note, in connection with articles I and II, that IAEA safeguard reports had not recorded any violation of Treaty commitments. He would, however, prefer IAEA safeguard reports to be more transparent, in order to enable States parties and the international community to assess IAEA safeguards activities. He expressed concern at the nuclear trade and the indirect assistance given to nuclear programmes not subject to IAEA safeguards. Of particular concern was the fact that the nuclear facilities of Israel and South Africa were not subject to Agency safeguards. He reiterated that under articles I and II, the transfer of any type of nuclear-weapon-related materials or services between a State party and a non-party, whether a nuclear-weapon or non-nuclear-weapon State, was precluded by the Treaty. Concerning article III, his Government urged States that had significant nuclear programmes to conclude safeguards agreements with IAEA. It also supported any initiative taken to subject civil nuclear facilities of nuclear-weapon States to IAEA safeguards, which would enable the cessation of fissionable material production to be verified.

As to article IV, the time had come to ensure more effective realization of its provisions. Since the world had moved into an era of co-operation rather than confrontation, a growing number of States parties needed increasing resources for civilian nuclear technology, in areas such as medicine, agriculture, hydrology and food technology. His delegation was disappointed that IAEA and other multilateral agencies had not been given sufficient political and resource support for technical co-operation and assistance in those fields. It was also regrettable that the United Nations Conference for the Promotion of International Co-operation in the Peaceful Uses of Nuclear Energy (UNCPICPUNE) and the IAEA Committee on Assurances of Supply had been unable to reach agreement on important subjects of international co-operation in the peaceful use of nuclear energy and supply of nuclear material and services. His delegation hoped that the Conference would give strong support for the establishment of suitable funding mechanisms in those areas.

Regarding article VI, he noted with satisfaction the progress in bilateral negotiations since 1985. The two nuclear super-Powers had concluded the INF Treaty and committed themselves to concluding the START Agreement. However, his Government was disappointed that there had been no agreement on effective limitations, and it thus feared that the quest for a new generation of nuclear weapons would continue.

There had been reports of new nuclear-weapon systems, including submarine-based missiles and cruise missiles. Moreover, even if 3 to 4 per cent of the missiles were destroyed under the INF Treaty, their warheads would be retained. The START Agreement envisaged much less than a 50 per cent reduction, but even after a 50 per cent reduction of the two super-Powers' strategic arsenals, those two countries would have 20 per cent more nuclear warheads than they had had in the early 1970s. Current negotiations had not produced any progress concerning a possible agreement on preventing an arms race in outer space. Research and development were continuing in that field. Sri Lanka was thus seriously concerned at the possibility of an expensive and destabilizing arms race in outer space coupled with the development of new nuclear weapons.

There was an urgent need to conclude a comprehensive nuclear test-ban treaty. Such a ban was an integral part of the purposes set forth in the preamble and in the provisions of article VI. Moreover, it was seen by a majority of States parties as one of the most effective measures for supporting the NPT. His Government welcomed the step-by-step negotiations taking place between the United States and the Soviet Union for the purposes of limiting the explosive yield of test explosions, and it hoped that their constructive dialogue would enable the Conference to arrive at a parallel commitment to initiate urgent negotiations towards a comprehensive test ban.

It was regrettable that the legitimate demands of the non-nuclear countries for effective security assurances against the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons had remained unfulfilled for nearly a quarter of a century. Negotiations in the Conference on Disarmament on that subject had not made any progress in the past 10 years.

There had been intense discussions about non-proliferation in the future. All seemed to agree that greater efforts were called for in order to achieve the purposes of the Treaty. His delegation believed that the future of the Treaty should be considered in a positive spirit so as to strengthen

its authority. The Treaty could meet new dangers if the States parties showed the necessary political will to strengthen it. He expected the Treaty to move into the future and not into history.

Mr. SOMOGYI (Republic of Hungary) said that participation by the greatest number of States ever at the Fourth Review Conference showed the growing significance that the community of nations attached to the effective functioning of the non-proliferation régime. It constituted recognition of the paramount political importance of the NPT, which was a contributing factor in reducing the danger of nuclear war and strengthening international peace and security. The NPT was an important stabilizing element in the current system of international relations, which was undergoing rapid but promising changes.

His Government fully subscribed to the political objectives set forth in the NPT and to the obligations aimed at their implementation. It therefore congratulated all the States that had acceded to the Treaty during the past five years and those that had expressed their intention to do so in the near future, and urged all other States to accede to the NPT.

His Government appreciated the fact that the basic provisions of the Treaty had been fulfilled. The nuclear-weapon States had not transferred nuclear weapons to other States, and the non-nuclear-weapon States parties had not acquired nuclear weapons. Nevertheless, concern had been expressed at the nuclear ambitions of certain so-called threshold States not parties to the Treaty. Thus it was crucial for the nuclear policies of States not parties to the NPT to be in harmony with the spirit of the Treaty, thus promoting international peace and security.

It was encouraging to note that significatnt steps had been taken towards halting the nuclear arms race and promoting disarmament. Since the NPT's entry into force, the Treaty on the Elimination of Intermediate-Range Missiles represented the first agreement eliminating an entire category of nuclear weapons. That initial measure held out favourable prospects. If recent political change was accompanied by political intent, progress in nuclear disarmament would no longer be a mere pipe-dream. His Government earnestly hoped that the Soviet-United States agreement on the reduction of strategic offensive weapons would soon be signed and followed by negotiations on further radical cuts in nuclear weapons.

His delegation deplored the fact that there had been no meaningful progress in the prohibition of nuclear weapons tests. At the same time, it welcomed the steps taken to bring bilateral threshold agreements into force. Negotiations on a comprehensive test-ban treaty could not be delayed any longer. With a new security concept emerging, progress in nuclear disarmament and a comprehensive test ban would be in full harmony with the spirit and letter of the NPT and might lead to the eventual elimination of nuclear deterrence.

Having signed the NPT, the non-nuclear-weapon States had accepted the obligation of preventing the spread of nuclear weapons, in the conviction that the nuclear-weapon States would provide guarantees not to threaten them. As a party to the NPT, Hungary required negative security guarantees.

IAEA's safeguards system played a key role in the operation of the non-proliferation régime based on the NPT. Additional countries had concluded safeguards agreements with IAEA, and all the nuclear-weapon States had voluntarily placed under IAEA control all or part of their civilian nuclear facilities. However, his delegation noted with regret that all States parties to the NPT had concluded safeguards agreements with IAEA within the time-limit set in the Treaty. Compliance with obligations under international treaties was an indispensable condition for any country to be a reliable partner within the community of nations.

His Government sought to increase the efficiency of safeguards activities by improving the conditions for the Agency's control in Hungary. It supported all efforts to improve the financial, technical and organizational conditions of the safeguards system. It was firmly convinced that the commitments undertaken as part of the NPT and the IAEA safeguards system had not in any way limited its nuclear activities for peaceful purposes. Its participation in international co-operation activities had enabled it to ensure the safety of its nuclear power plant, to devise modern systems of accounting and reporting nuclear materials, and to undertake research and development programmes. It would continue to participate, as both donor and beneficiary, in the Agency's technical assistance and co-operation programme.

The existing pattern of co-operation between suppliers was an important element in the reliable operation of the non-proliferation régime with regard to nuclear exports. Hungary had implemented the recommendations of the

London Club and the Zangger Committee in that area. The changes that had recently taken place in the country's economic activity would not entail any relaxation of its commitments concerning nuclear exports.

His Government attached paramount importance to those aspects of the non-proliferation régime that had a direct impact on national security and international confidence. As a small country with a high population density, it was in favour of the prohibition of attacks on nuclear facilities and had, with Sweden and the Netherlands, sponsored a working paper on that issue. The tragic consequences of Chernobyl indicated that a nuclear catastrophe, regardless of cause, created transboundary perils. The formulation and conclusion of a treaty on the prohibition of armed attacks on nuclear facilities therefore demanded international co-operation.

The far-reaching changes taking place in the world, which were altering old enemy images, aroused hopes that that issue and the modalities for solving it would be addressed in a constructive manner in the concluding document of the Review Conference. Similarly, consideration should be given to the measures to be taken in cases where a State party, by declaring its intention to acquire nuclear-weapons capability, tended to undermine international confidence in the Treaty.

The implementation of the NPT over the past 20 years had not been without its problems, but they could not call the Treaty's authority into question. It was to be hoped that the States parties would be able to formulate, and to adopt by consensus, a substantive concluding document that would reflect their endeavours to strengthen the non-proliferation régime. The outcome of the deliberations would undoubtedly have an effect on the future of the NPT, whose basic objective was to save future generations from the dangers posed by the existence and spread of nuclear weapons. His delegation stood ready to work in a constructive spirit for the success of the Conference.

Mr. KONGSIRI (Thailand) said that he wished to bring 14 points to the attention of the Review Conference. First, his Government reaffirmed its full support for, and commitment to, the NPT and called on all States that were not yet parties to accede to it.

The international community must continue to prevent States from obtaining nuclear explosives - by political, economic and security means. His Government urged nuclear supplier States to control exports and transfers

of technology most carefully, especially "dual-use" exports. It hoped that more supplier States would join the nuclear suppliers' group with its stringent controls and that the Zangger Committee would be strengthened.

His Government was concerned at ballistic missile proliferation and the export of technology to build such missiles, and it urged more adherence to the missile technology control régime (MTCR).

It would like to see those States with unsafeguarded nuclear activities place all the relevant facilities under safeguards.

In extending co-operation and assistance in the peaceful uses of nuclear energy, States should ensure that the receiving State was a party to the NPT and applied full-scope IAEA safeguards based on the Treaty. Apparently, only seven countries had adopted such a policy. His Government urged other suppliers to take that most significant step.

In that context, his Government hoped that IAEA would be strengthened financially, and it urged those countries that had not yet paid their dues to fulfil their obligations punctually.

His Government also called on the developed countries to provide to the developing countries parties to the NPT adequate technical assistance and co-operation for peaceful uses of nuclear energy, in order to promote their economic and social development. The implementation of article III (safeguards) and article IV (promotion of peaceful uses of nuclear energy) should be even-handed.

His Government welcomed proposals which would provide more security guarantees that nuclear States would not use nuclear weapons in a possible conflict with non-nuclear countries.

His delegation was pleased that the Partial Test Ban Treaty Amendment Conference would be held in New York in early 1991, and hoped that progress would be made towards nuclear disarmament and a comprehensive test-ban treaty.

It welcomed the new protocols that ensured effective verification of the threshold Test-Ban Treaty and the Peaceful Nuclear Explosions Treaty, and hoped that the two Treaties would soon be ratified.

His Government was pleased that significant progress had been made towards arms reduction agreements.

It was happy to note that the number of observers to the Conference had increased, and that China and France were participating for the first time.

His delegation endorsed the statement made on 22 August by the representative of Yugoslavia on behalf of the delegations of the non-aligned and other States parties to the NPT not belonging to the East European or Western Groups. However, it noted that that consensus statement amalgamated a variety of views and interests.

Lastly, his delegation would make every effort to help the Conference produce a final document by consensus. Given the improved atmosphere between East and West and between the two super-Powers, it was optimistic about the outcome of the Conference.

The meeting rose at 1 p.m.